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Christmas: Private Cause of Action for Unfair Insurance Claim Settlement Pra

INSURANCE-Deceptive Trade Practices-Private Cause Of
Action For Unfair Insurance Claim Settlement Practices
Exists Under Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act And
Insurance Code.
Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company,

754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
In 1978, Melvin and Maryanne Vail (Vail) purchased a fire insurance policy for their home from Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company
(Texas Farm).' During the term of the policy, the Vails' home was completely destroyed by fire.2 The Vails sought reimbursement through their
insurance policy, but were notified by Texas Farm that their claim had been
denied.' After pursuing their administrative remedies,4 the Vails filed suit
against Texas Farm, arguing that the company's unfair claim settlement
practices5 and bad faith failure to honor their claim 6 violated both the De1. Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. 1988)(purchased
fire insurance policy insuring home for $25,000.00 and contents at $10,000.00).
2. Id. at 130. The Vails' home and its contents were destroyed by fire on July 18, 1979.
Id. The home and contents were valued under the policy at $35,000.00. Id. The policy on
their home was a valued policy and therefore the contract itself sets the value of the property
and it was not necessary for the Vails to prove the actual loss. Id. at 137. Proof of the loss of
their contents was required, however, and the jury found the Vails' content loss to be the
amount of coverage, $10,000.00. Id.
3. Id. at 131. Texas Farm's agent said the company would not "willingly" pay this claim
because an adequate list of the contents destroyed in the fire had not been provided. Texas
Farm hired an investigator, who found no indication of arson. After this finding, Texas Farm
commissioned a second investigation conducted by the State Fire Marshall's office. The Fire
Marshall's office analyzed four samples of the debris left from the fire, three of which indicated
some evidence of arson. Based on the Marshall's evidence, Texas Farm then changed its basis
for denial of the claim from an "inadequate list" to arson. In the trial court, expert testimony
discredited much of the validity of the Fire Marshall's tests. Subsequently on appeal, arson
was no longer raised as an issue and Texas Farm did not dispute their liability for the claim
under the policy. See Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vail, 695 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1985), rev'd, 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988). Texas Farm admitted on appeal that
the full amount of the policy was due and payable and conceded the judgment was correct in
that respect. Id.
4. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 137 (Tex. 1988)(Vails
sent letter to Farm Bureau making demand for payment). The letter stated in part:
This letter is to officially make demand upon you for payment under the policy for the
value of the dwelling and the lost contents to the extent of the full coverage of the policy.
Id.
5. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Tex. 1988)(Texas
Farm failed to promptly, fairly and equitably settle their claim after liability clearly estab-
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ceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)7 and the Texas Insurance Code.' In
addition to these statutory allegations, the Vails also asserted that Texas
Farm violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing.9 At trial,
the jury found in favor of the Vails and awarded them full recovery of the
policy amount,' 0 as well as treble damages under the DTPA" and other
additional damages.' 2 Texas Farm appealed' 3 and the court of appeals relished); see also TEX.

INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981), Section 2 lists six acts or
practices considered to be unfair claim settlement practices. Id. The failure to act in good
faith in providing prompt, fair, and equitable payment of a claim submitted where the insurer's
liability is reasonably clear, is among the six definitions listed as unfair or deceptive practices.
See id. § 2(d).
6. See Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 131 (jury found Texas Farm intentionally failed to process
claim in good faith since they refused prompt, fair and equitable settlement after liability
established).
7. See TEX, Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon 1987)(consumer has cause
of action when any person violates Article 21.21 of Insurance Code or rules or regulations
issued by Insurance Board and such acts produce actual damages); see also Vail, 754 S.W.2d at
131 (Vails asserted cause of action under section 17.50(a)(4) of DTPA).
8. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 21.21, 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988). Article

21.21, section 16(a) lists the relief available to injured parties. See id. Under this section any
person who prevails in the action against the insurance company may be awarded three times
the actual damages, courts costs and reasonable attorney's fees; or an order enjoining the conduct; or any relief the court finds proper. See id. § 16(b). If the court finds, however, an action
was brought in bad faith or for harassment purposes, the court may then award the defendant
reasonable attorney's fees. See id. § 16(c). Article 21.21-2 section 2 defines acts which if frequently committed, constitute unfair claim settlement practices. See id. Under section 6(a)
the State Board of Insurance is given the power to issue cease and desist orders if they find an
insurance company engaging in unlawful practices. Id.
9. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 135 (Tex. 1988)(insurance company breaches duty of good faith and fair dealing if it fails to promptly and equitably
pay claim when its liability becomes reasonably clear); see also Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. 1988)(common law duty of care and trustworthiness is implied in every contract, including insurance contracts); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987)(duty to deal in good faith and deal fairly recognized). See generally G. KORNBLUM, M. KAUFMAN & H. LEVINE, BAD FAITH PRACTICE
GUIDE 1-1 (1986)(term bad faith indicates breach of covenant of "good faith and fair dealing"
which is implied in every contract by law and gives rise to both tort liability and breach of
contract); Comment, Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.: Texas Adopts
First-PartyBad Faith, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 835, 836 (1987)(common law remedy for post-loss
conduct of insurance company allowing recovery for amount due provided little motivation for
insurance company to pay claims owed until Texas recognized this duty). But see Chitsey v.
National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Tex. 1987)(good faith and fair dealing not
recognized in Texas).
10. See Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 131 (full policy amount was $35,000).
11. See Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vail, 695 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. App.Dallas 1985)(trebled policy amount was $105,000.00), rev'd, 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
12. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. 1988). At
trial, the jury awarded three times the value of the policy which amounted to $105,000. In
addition, the court awarded attorney's fees and prejudgment interest of 6% from date of judg-
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versed, in part, stating that a private cause of action was not provided by
article 21.21-2 of the Insurance Code or by the DTPA. 4 The Vails were
allowed to recover the amount of their policy plus prejudgment interest and
attorney's fees from Texas Farm but were denied additional damages under
the DTPA."5 The Vails appealed to the Texas Supreme Court which
granted certiorari to decide whether the court of appeals was correct in reversing the trial court's award of treble damages and its holding that no
private cause of action existed for unfair claim settlement practices under
both the DTPA and Insurance Code. 6 Held-Reversed. A private cause of
action for unfair insurance claim settlement practices exists under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Insurance Code."
For centuries, business and consumer transactions were governed by the
common law and its general rule of caveat emptor: let the buyer beware.1 8

ment which totaled $22,869.84. There is a split of authority between courts allowing trebled
prejudgment interest. Compare Industrial-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., Inc., 602
S.W.2d 282, 298 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ)(allowed trebled prejudgment interest) with
Precision Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 671 S.W.2d 924, 930-31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(did not allow trebled prejudgment interest).
13. See Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vail, 695 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. App.Dallas 1985)(appealed damage award claiming liability for face amount of policy, prejudgment
interest upon dwelling policy, and attorney's fees), rev'd, 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
14. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. 1988)(court
of appeals reversed trial court's decision holding no private cause of action under either DTPA
or Insurance Code); see also Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vail, 695 S.W.2d 692, 694
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1985)(court of appeals held neither article 21.2 l-2n or DTPA created private cause of action), rev'd, 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988)(only available remedy was cease and
desist order issued by State Board of Insurance).
15. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. 1988)(court
of appeals reversed trebled damages and granted recovery of policy amount, prejudgment interest and attorney's fees); see also Texas Farm, 695 S.W.2d at 695 (judgment modified to
allow recovery of policy amount, prejudgment interest at six percent on policy amount and
$12,640.00 as attorney's fees). This appeal was heard before Justice Allen of the Court of
Appeals of Dallas and, by two retired justices, the Honorable Bert H. Tunks, Chief Justice,
14th Court of Appeals, Houston and The Honorable Quentin Keith, Justice, Ninth Supreme
Judicial District sitting by assignment. Id. at 693 n. 1 & 2.
16. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. 1988)(court
addressed whether insured had cause of action against insurer for unfair settlement practices of
claim under which Vails contended they had properly plead case, and had proved injury under
Deceptive Trade Practices Act and/or Texas Insurance Code).
17. Id. at 136.
18. See Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. 383, 388 (1870)(caveat emptor established common
law principle). There is not a better established principle in common law than the maxim of
caveat emptor. Id. This rule is best adapted to business transactions and requires the purchaser to take care of his own interests. Id.; see also Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S.
108, 116 (1884)(as to ordinary sales, both buyer and seller are on equal grounds and buyer
purchases on own judgment entirely); D. PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW
§ 2.03 (1988)(doctrine of caveat emptor considered buyer who believed seller's false claims
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The Texas legislature recognized that this rule left consumers virtually defenseless against misrepresentation, unfair treatment and breach of warranty
by the business community.' 9 To address these problems, Governor Dolph
Briscoe signed the Deceptive Trade Practices Consumer Protection Act
(DTPA) into law2' in 1973.2" Since its creation, the DTPA has been the

unworthy of legal protection). A medieval scholar, Anthony Fitzherbert, is given credit for
originating the phrase in 1534. Id. He originated the phrase when advising a prospective
horse buyer "[i]f he be tame and have been ryden upon then caveat emptor." Id. Nineteenth
century judges saw no injustice or inconvenience from this doctrine because they felt it "sharpened wits, taught self-reliance, made a man-an economic man-out of the buyer, and served
well its two masters, business and justice". Id. at 2-6. The promoters of this doctrine believed
it was good medicine and taught them to look out for their interests. Id at 2-7; see also Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1164 (1931)(doctrine of caveat
emptor first appeared in print at end of sixteenth century). Finally, caveat emptor was declared by Mr. Justice Davis, of the United States Supreme Court, to be of universal acceptance
that it should be accepted by all the courts in the United States where common law prevails.
Id. at 1181. The doctrine has been refined through the years to limit its harshness but caveat
emptor still retains some merit and still means that buyers in their purchases are still playing a
game of chance. Id. at 1187.
19. See Maxwell, Public and Private Rights and Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade
Practices-ConsumerProtectionAct, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 617-18 (1977)(although continually
subject to unlawful business practices, consumer had almost no legal recourse); see also D.
BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION v (2d ed. 1983). Rem-

edies at common law to prevent consumers from receiving numerous phone calls, fraudulent
misrepresentations, and insolent language from debt collectors were inadequate because the
consumer had the heavy burden of proof as well as the high cost of litigation. Id. Landlords
had the right to cut off a tenant's utilities, to wrongfully withhold the tenant's security deposit
or in some drastic cases, prevent the tenant from residing on the leased premises. Salesmen
could pressure consumers into buying expensive items they did not want or need and sellers
could exaggerate the value of their services or goods. Even though these actions were not
lawful, the consumer could do little because it was not practical to pursue a small claim due to
the high cost of litigation. Id.
20. See Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 143, § 5, 322, 343, Tex.
Gen. Laws 1973 (first enactment of DTPA); see also D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY,
TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION v (2d ed. 1983). John L. Hill, Attorney General when the

DTPA was passed, declared that the Act sought to rectify the dilemma the consumer faced
when bringing an action under breach of warranty or common law fraud. Id. at iv. A consumer claimant faced numerous defenses to his suit as well as the fact that many of the cases
were only for a nominal dollar amount which made litigation impractical. The Attorney General's staff, in association with representatives of both the Texas Consumer Association and
Texas Retail Federation, drafted a proposal, which later became the DTPA, to remedy the
consumer's problems. Id.; Maxwell, Publicand Private Rights and Remedies Underthe Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtectionAct, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 620 (1977). Initially, the
Texas legislature to correct the consumer's dilemma, enacted the Debt Collection Practices
Act which prohibited debt collectors from using coercion, threats, harassment, unfair means or
misleading representations. Id. at 619. The next effort concerned tenant rights and prohibited
landlords from interrupting utility service and from intentionally preventing the tenant from
entering his residence. Consumers were next given the right in home solicitations to cancel
without obligation within three business days. Id. at 620. Finally, of even more significance
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topic of legislative scrutiny and emendation in each subsequent legislative
session. 22
In 1977, the Texas Supreme Court first interpreted the DTPA in Woods v.
Littleton.23 In Woods, the court recognized that the legislative intent in
drafting the DTPA was to encourage consumers to pursue relief while deterring sellers from engaging in deceptive trade practices.24 Decisions following Woods further expanded the DTPA by finding that the legislative intent
was not to be gleaned from isolated portions of the act but rather from the
act taken as a whole. 25 Further guidance to the DTPA's construction was

was the passage of the DTPA and its remedies and authorization of private consumers to
recover treble damages. Id. at 621.
21. See, e.g., Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980)(DTPA's purpose to
extend cause of action to consumers for deceptive trade practices by taking away burden of
proof and numerous common-law defenses for breach of warranty or fraud); Woo v. Great
Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(enactment of DTPA reflects legislature's recognition of shortcomings of traditional
common law remedies for deceptive trade practices); Success Motivation Institute, Inc. v.
Lawlis, 503 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.XpreDTPA common-law fraud action allowed recovery of difference between value parted with and
value received). See also Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The Amendments to the Consumer
Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1976)(passage of DTPA by Texas legislature removed many obstacles facing deceived consumer and ended use of caveat emptor); Maxwell,
Public and Private Rights and Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade Practices -Consumer Protection Act, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 620-21 (1977)(DTPA most significant and far-reaching
consumer litigation passed, especially in remedial measures).
22. See D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION XXX
(2d ed. 1983 and Supp. 1988)(Deceptive Trade Practices Act amended in each legislative session beginning 1975 through last legislative session in 1987).
23. 554 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1977)(plaintiffs found to be consumers under DTPA and
even though sale occurred prior to effective date of DTPA, action complained of occurred after
effective date and was valid claim).
24. See id. at 669 (Wood court acknowledged intent of legislature in drafting DTPA was
to encourage injured consumers to seek compensation and deter perfidious sellers who engage
in deceptive trade practices); see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon
1987)(liberal construction and application of DTPA to further its purpose to protect consumers from unconscionable actions, "false, misleading and deceptive business practices" and
breaches of warranty); McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1977, no writ)(DTPA provides effective relief to aggrieved consumers who could not or would
not sue but for these remedies); Curry, The Texas Supreme Court and the DTPA: Ten Years
After, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 1987 DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-CONSUMER PROTECTION INSTITUTE A-I (1987)(Wood decision expansively interpreted scope of DTPA to affect
consumer protection).
25. See Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. 1980)(legislative intent
should be ascertained from language of act as whole and not from isolated sections). Courts
are not limited by a strict meaning, but should apply the legislative intent. Id.; see, e.g., Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex. 1987)(DTPA to be liberally construed and used to promote purpose to protect consumers from breaches of warranty and
provide economical course of action to secure protection); North Am. Van Lines of Texas, Inc.
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provided in Smith v. Baldwin, which explained that the primary aim of the
DTPA was to give consumers, who were harmed by deceptive trade practices, a cause of action without the heavy burden imposed by common law of
proving fraud or breach of warranty.26
Because the DTPA was enacted to protect the "consumer," 2 the injured
party must qualify under the DTPA's definition of "consumer" in order to
maintain a cause of action.2" A consumer is defined as one who either seeks
v. Bauerle, 678 S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(act should be
construed liberally to protect consumers from misleading, false, and deceptive business practices); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ)(liberal construction to be given to act to promote purpose
to protect consumer). See generally Curry, The Texas Supreme Court and the DTPA: Ten
Years After, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 1987 DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-CONSUMER PROTECTION INSTITUTE A-I (1987)(over past ten years approximately 69 Texas Supreme Court

decisions rendered without court waivering from commitment to preserve legislative intent of
Act to protect consumers).
26. See Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1981)(DTPA not merely codification of common law but enacted to provide cause of action without consumer having to
counter numerous defenses developed at common law for breach of warranty or fraud action);
see also Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 690 (Tex. 1980). In Pennington, the court
stated that:
[Olne purpose of DTPA's treble damages provision is to encourage privately initiated
consumer litigation, reducing the need for public enforcement. Probably the greatest obstacle to private consumer litigation is the high costs, in terms of money and time, that
must be expended by the plaintiff. The small amount involved in the typical consumer
claim does not justify these high costs of litigation. Recognition of this disincentive to sue
may even encourage wrongful trade practices by some sellers. The legislature has provided for extra damage recovery so that consumers will have incentives to pursue their
claims.
Id. In Jim Walter Homes v. Valencia, the court stated that the legislature recognized that
trebling damages in each case was harsh, particularly in cases when innocent misrepresentations where subjected to this penalty. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Valencia, 690 S.W.2d
239, 241 (Tex. 1985). In Valencia, the court acknowledged that the legislature amended the
DTPA in 1979 to mitigate these effects while still making every effort to protect the consumer.
Id. at 241. Through these amendments, the legislature sought to: 1. maintain mandatory
treble damages for causes of action concerning small claims; 2. innocent misrepresentations
were eliminated from automatic treble damages; and 3. consumers were still allowed to recover
treble damages for knowing violations under the DTPA. The purpose behind allowing multiple recovery is to encourage the initiation of litigation by consumers and deter violations of the
DTPA by sellers. Id. at 242.
27. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon 1987)(purpose of DTPA to protect consumer); see also Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Tex. 1977)(DTPA enacted
to provide consumers with method and incentive to dissuade deceptive trade practices); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1979, no writXpurpose of DTPA to protect consumers from false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty).
28. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987)(definitional provision
of DTPA including definition of consumer). This section defines consumer as "an individual,
partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of this state who seeks or ac-
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or acquires goods or services for purchase or lease.29 The purchase of an
insurance policy has been held to be a service under the DTPA and, therefore, within its protection. 30 In addition to protection under the DTPA, one
who purchases insurance may also maintain a cause of action under the
Texas Insurance Code.3 1 Under the Insurance Code, the term "consumer"

quires by purchase or lease, any goods or services ...." Id.; see also Kennedy v. Sale, 689
S.W.2d 890, 892-93 (Tex. 1985)(employee for whom insurance purchased held to be consumer;
standing as consumer determined by person's relationship to proceeding and simply not
granted in contractual relationship); TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon
1987)(cause of action may be maintained by consumer when actual damage results). Consumers may maintain a cause of action when the act or practice is the producing cause of the
damage. Id. Section 17.50(a)(1) grants consumers relief when actual damage is produced by
"the use or employment by any person of an act or practice in violation of Article 21.21, Texas
Insurance Code, as amended, or rules or regulations issued by the State Board of Insurance
under Article 21.21, Texas Insurance Code, as amended." Id.; Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d
794, 801 (Tex. 1975)(defines producing cause as efficient, contributing or exciting cause which
produces injury or damage in natural sequence). See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J.
LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 207-10 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1988)(producing
cause is test for showing causation).
29. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987)(section defines consumer as one who seeks or acquires good or services); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741
S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. 1987). There are two requirements which must be met to acquire the
DTPA consumer status. The first requirement is that the plaintiff sought or acquired the good
or service by a purchase or lease. Second, the good or service purchased or leased has to form
the reason for the complaint. Id. at 351-52; Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d at 892 (person who
did not actually seek insurance policy but who had acquired benefits of coverage allowed to
recover under DTPA as consumer). But see Rodriguez v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 598
S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Under the DTPA, a
consumer must actually seek or acquire the good that relates to or results in the deceptive
practice claim. Id. Merely seeking or acquiring a good or service is not enough to receive the
consumer protection. Id.
30. See Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ)(insurance policies included under protection and
coverage of section 17.50 of DTPA); see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(2)
(Vernon 1987)(defining service as work, labor, or service acquired for use); D. BRAGG, P.
MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 26, 172 (2d ed. 1983)(purchase of
insurance constitutes purchase of service under Insurance Code and plaintiff not required to
conform to DTPA definition of "consumer" but must be "person" to maintain cause of action). But see Jay Freeman Co. v. Glenn Falls Ins. Co., 486 F. Supp. 140, 142 (N.D. Tex.
1980)(not intent of DTPA to include insurance policies within coverage since insurance policies intangible contractual rights); cf Mobile County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewell, 555 S.W.2d 903,
910 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977)(at time of decision, county mutual insurance companies
exempt from state's insurance laws except as specifically provided), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam,
566 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1978).
31. See TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. art. 21.21, §§ 1-24 (Vernon 1981 and Supp. 1988)(section
of Insurance Code dealing with unfair practices and competition). Section 1 of article 21.21
provides that the purpose of the act is for regulation of trade practices within the insurance
business and also to define or provide for determination of the practices which are unfair or
deceptive and prohibit such actions. Id. § 1. Section 3 provides that no person shall engage in
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has been replaced by "person," thus avoiding the definitional requirement of
"consumer" under the DTPA.3 2 Therefore, when an unfair or deceptive
practice is committed by an insurance company 33 against a "consumer"

any practice defined or determined in accordance with this Act to be a method of competition
which is unfair or engage in an act or practice which is deemed to be unfair or deceptive in the

practice of the insurance business. Id. § 3. Section 4 lists eight definitions within this article
which are either unfair competition methods or acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive.
Id. § 16. Section 16 provides the relief available to injured persons. This relief is available to
persons injured by practices which are defined in section 4, or if injured by noncompliance to a
rule or regulation adopted by the Board of Insurance to be unfair or injured by any practice
contained in section 17.46 of the Business and Commerce Code. Id. §§ 1-24; see also Austin v.
Servac Shipping Line, Ltd., 610 F. Supp. 229, 235 (E.D. Tex. 1985)(plaintiff sought and received relief under article 21.21, section 16 of Insurance Code for violations of Insurance
Board Order when defendant insurance company denied claim and refused to pay claims absent investigation).
32. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988)(definition of "person" within provision). This section defines person to mean "any individual, corporation, association, partnership, reciprocal exchange, inter-insurer, Lloyds insurer, fraternal benefit
society, and any other legal entity engaged in the business of insurance, including agents, brokers, adjusters and life insurance counselors." Id. A court of civil appeals decision held the
definition of "person" only included those who worked in the business of insurance. See
Ceshker v. Bankers Commercial Life Ins. Co., 558 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1977), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 568 S.W.2d at 128 (Tex. 1978). In the per curiam opinion
which followed, however, the supreme court disapproved that portion of the opinion which
limited "person" to one working in the insurance business. See Ceshker v. Bankers Commercial Life Ins. Co., 568 S.W.2d at 129; see also Hi-Line Elec. Co. v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 587
S.W.2d 488, 490-91 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 593 S.W.2d
953 (Tex. 1980). The court of civil appeals had held that a "person" under article 21.21,
section 16(a) also had to be a consumer under section 17.50 of the DTPA because these two
statutes had to be read together. Id. The supreme court did not overturn this decision but in
their per curiam opinion stated they did not approve the conclusion that a "person" also had
to qualify as a consumer under the DTPA to allow a private cause of action under article 21.21
of the Insurance Code. Hi-Line Elec. Co. v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 593 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex.
1980); cf. Chaffin v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 731 S.W.2d 728, 731 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(although "person" not limited to one in business of insurance,
decision limited person under Insurance Code as one who is either beneficiary under policy or
insured himself). See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER

LITIGATION 172 (2d ed. 1983 and Supp. 1988)(whether one is agent, insurance company, insured, competitor, beneficiary, consumer, or just member of general public, it is clear, if injured, claim exists under Insurance Code).
33. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.14-1, § 2 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988)(all aspects of
insurance business covered under definition of insurance industry, including conduct ranging
from initial solicitation to payment of claims). Under this article, the term insurer includes all
associations, corporations, partnerships and individuals. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.
141, § 2a (Vernon Supp. 1988). Acts which constitute conducting an insurance business in Texas
include: 1. making or proposing an insurance contract; 2. taking or receiving any insurance
application; 3. directly or indirectly acting as agent by soliciting, negotiating or procuring
insurance or any renewals. Id. This section provides in total ten acts which if accomplished
by mail or any other means is defined as conducting an insurance business in Texas. Id.; see
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purchasing insurance, a cause of action arises under both the DTPA and the
Texas Insurance Code.34
Under the DTPA and article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, a private cause
of action may be brought when the rules or regulations issued by the State
Board of Insurance or the direct provisions of article 21.21 are violated. 3 In
addition to these provisions, section 17.46 of the DTPA provides that any
conduct which is "false, misleading or deceptive," includes, but is not limited to, a twenty-four item "laundry list" of such acts or practices deemed
unlawful.3 6 Section 17.50 of the DTPA also provides two additional causes

also Kreisler, A Survey of InsuranceLitigation Under the Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesAct,
18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 177, 177 (1987). The insurance business has been attacked by the
Texas consumer with a formidable weapon; the DTPA in conjunction with the Texas Insurance Code. Id. The three major areas of attack have been on the acts of insurance agents as
well as on the handling of first and third party claims. Id.
34. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon 1987)(consumer granted
cause of action when person violates article 21.21 of Insurance Code or regulations of State
Board of Insurance). Any person who uses or employs an act or practice which violates Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code or violates any rule or regulation of the State Board of
Insurance, is subject to an action by a consumer where these acts are a producing cause of
damages. Id.; see also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988)(person
may maintain action against person who engages in unlawful deceptive trade practice under
section 4 of article, under rules and regulations of Board under this article or under any practice listed in Section 17.46 of Business & Commerce Code). See generally D. BRAGG. P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 169-70 (2d ed. 1983)(section
17.50(a)(4) of DTPA specifically aimed at insurance industry since it authorizes suit for violation of insurance code which supplements action against insurance industry).
35. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon 1987)(provides cause of
action when violation occurs under article 21.21 of Insurance Code or rules and regulations
promulgated by State Board of Insurance under article 21.21); see also Insurance, 28 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 21 (Hart Nov. 1, 1986)(trade practices). Section 21.3 lists the trade practices
which are prohibited and provides that even if the practice is not defined in any other section,
it is prohibited if it is determined by law to be an unfair or deceptive act or practice. Id. This
section derived from State Board of Insurance Order 18663. Section 21.203 prohibits all insurers from engaging in unfair claims settlement practices. Unfair claims settlement practices
under this section are defined as committing or performing any one of the seventeen listed
practices with "frequency" to indicate that this is a general business practice. Id. This section
is derived from State Board of Insurance Order 41454. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 134-35 (Tex. 1988).
36. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987)(section 17.46(b) provides
non-exclusive twenty-four item list of conduct considered to be "false, misleading or deceptive
acts or practices" and declared unlawful when practiced in commerce or trade). Since 1979,
section 17.46(a) is only enforceable by the Attorney General's Office and a private cause of
action is no longer conferred under this section. See Kreisler, A Survey of InsuranceLitigation
Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 177, 180 (1987); see
also Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 603, § 3, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws
1327 (amendment added language that false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices subject
to action by consumer protection division); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(8) (Vernon
1987)(consumer protection division defined antitrust and consumer protection division of at-
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of action, one for breach of an implied or express warranty and the other for
unconscionable actions by any person.3 7 These latter two causes of action,
however, are not available to persons who sue an insurance company for
38
unfair practices under section 16 of article 21.21 of the Insurance Code.
Therefore, a "consumer" who purchases insurance has several causes of action which may be pursued under section 17.50(a) of the DTPA as well as
under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code.39
The DTPA and Insurance Code have repeatedly been used against the
insurance industry in the area of first and third party claims," particularly
in cases involving sales misrepresentations and post-loss claims misconduct.4 1 Liability for third-party claims is well recognized and this rationale

torney general's office). There is some indication, however, that this limitation against a private cause of action does not apply in suits brought against insurers under section 17.50(a)(4)
of the DTPA and article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. Id.; see also Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar
Consultants, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Tex. 1979)(private cause of action allowed under section 17.46 of DTPA); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 605 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)(private cause of action allowed under 21.21 of Insurance Code in accordance
with section 17.46 of DTPA).
37. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 1987)(section 17.50(a)(2) provides action for breach of warranty and section 17.50(a)(3) provides unconscionable conduct
action).
38. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1988)(provides relief to
persons sustaining actual damages as result of another's unfair acts or practices). A person
who sues under section 16 of article 21.21 has three available causes of action. One action is
for a violation of practices declared unfair in section 4 of article 21.21. Another action may be
maintained for a violation of any of the rules or regulations adopted by the Insurance Board
and the last cause of action is allowed for a violation of any practice as defined in section 17.46
of the DTPA. Id.; see also D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER
LITIGATION § 7.02.03 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1988).
39. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 19887)(provides relief for consumers actually damaged); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988)(provides cause of action for unfair practices and competition).
40. See W. SHERNOFF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION 5-3
(1987). A first party claim arises under an insurance policy where the insurance company
agrees to pay the benefits directly to the insured. Id. Types of insurance which give rise to
first-party claims include life, health and accident insurance, property damage, fire, title and
disability insurance. The third party claim arises in situations where the insured buys insurance which will protect him from liability to third parties because the insurance company
indemnifies the insured. Id.
41. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Marshall, 724 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.
1987Xmisrepresentations concerning coverage and benefits exactly type of conduct which gives
rise to cause of action under DTPA); Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d
705, 707 (Tex. 1983)(transaction continues past time of purchase and encompasses entire
course of dealings between parties); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 603 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.Xpost-loss conduct forms basis for cause of action under
DTPA). See generally Kreisler, A Survey of Insurance Litigation Under the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 177, 177 (1977)(DTPA and Insurance Code used
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may serve as the foundation for allowing first-party claims.4 2 Despite long-

standing precedent holding third-party claims as a valid cause of action
against an insurance company,4 3 the insurance industry contends that the
consumer is barred from bringing a first party cause of action for acts or
practices arising from post-loss claims under either the DTPA or the Insurance Code."
The insurance industry asserts that a breach by an insurance company
does not terminate its obligations because the insured still has a right to be
paid under the policy and therefore is not damaged.4 In addition, the industry asserts the legislature enacted article 21.21-2 of the Insurance Code to
provide an adequate remedy for injuries resulting from unfair claim settlement practices.46 This section provides for action by the Board of Insurance

by consumers against insurance industry for sales misrepresentations and post-loss
misconduct).
42. See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, opinion approved). This landmark decision allowed liability to occur in a mishandling of third-party claims. Id. The rationale behind this decision in allowing
the third-party claim was that the insurer had the exclusive control to handle the plaintiff's
affairs and at the same time was acting as his agent. Id.; see also Kelly, 680 S.W.2d at 605
(DTPA and Insurance Code provide private cause of action in Stowers doctrine case for postloss misconduct, and former opinion to contrary clearly erroneous). But see Rosell v. Farmers
Texas County Mut. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no
writ)(failure to negotiate third party claim in good faith not actionable under section 17.50 of
DTPA). See generally Comment, An Insurer'sFailure to Settle: Standing Under the Stowers
Doctrine, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and Article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, 34
BAYLOR L. REV. 441, 442 (1982)(Stower's doctrine still powerful force in insurance litigation
and important factor for insurance company to consider when rejecting an insured's claim).
43. See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, opinion approved)(rule would be harsh if insurance company owed
,no duty while it had complete control over the actions involved). The court held that the
insurer cannot betray the insured's trust but must serve him as promised. See id. at 548.
44. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 562 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1978)(private citizen not given cause of action under article 21.21-2 of
Insurance Code, and DTPA inapplicable to insurance policies and claims arising therefrom),
rev'd on other grounds, 576 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. 1978); Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574
S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(private cause of action
not conferred upon individuals since legislature provided remedy for cease and desist orders as
remedy for injury resulting from unfair claim settlement practice); Russell v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(no private
cause of action under Insurance Code or DTPA to private individual).
45. See Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(plaintiff still has contractual right after breach occurs and remedy
is to maintain suit to enforce contractual rights); see also Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Stice, 640 S.W.2d 955, 960 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(awarded benefits of
policy so no actual damages resulted). Because the party recovered the benefits under the
policy and was awarded that amount by the trial court, no actual damages had been sustained
and the court rendered a take nothing judgment. Id.
46. See McKnight v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 362, 364 (N.D. Tex. 1982Xarticle
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instead of the individual claiming unfair settlement practices.4 7 Contrary to
the insurance industry's contentions, some lower court decisions have affirmed a private cause of action for claims handling misconduct under the
DTPA and article 21.21 of the Insurance Code.48 Not all courts, however,
agree that a private cause of action exists and instead have held that the
Insurance Board is to issue cease and desist orders as the sanction for unfair
or deceptive practices.49 Finally, some courts have recognized a special relationship between the insurer and insured that implies a duty of good faith

21.21-2 intended to give State Insurance Board authority to investigate and reprimand certain
practices, not intended to provide individuals with private cause of action.); see also Lone Star
Life Ins. Co., 574 S.W.2d at 580 (legislature provided remedies for injuries resulting from
unfair settlement practices by empowering State Board of Insurance to stop such practices by
issuing cease and desist order); Russell, 548 S.W.2d at 742 (article 21.21-2 does not confer
private cause of action, but empowers board to issue cease and desist orders); TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981)(unfair claims settlement practices act). Article 21.21-2, section 6(a) of the Insurance Code provides that the State Board of Insurance has power to issue,
upon a finding that an insurer has violated any provision of the Act, a cease and desist order to
stop the unlawful practices. Id. See generally Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-218 (1984)(article
21.21-2 does not confer private cause of action but provides for cease and desist orders to be
issued by Board of Insurance).
47. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981)(provides practices which are
unfair claim settlements and remedies to be applied by State Board of Insurance). Section 3 of
this article gives the State Board of Insurance power to require an insurance company, who
has had complaints filed against it, to file a report and be subjected to close supervision. Id.
Section 6 gives the Board the power to issue cease and desist orders to insurance companies
violating any provision of this article. If the insurance company does not comply with the
order, the Board is further given the power to revoke or suspend the company's certificate of
authority. Id.
48. See Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ)(DTPA's underlying purpose to protect consumer
and therefore grants individual private cause of action); see also Austin v. Servac Shipping
Line, 610 F. Supp. 229, 235 (E.D. Tex. 1985)(plaintiffs allowed to incorporate Board Order
which defined as unfair claim settlement practice denial and refusal to pay claim; relief granted
under article 21.21 without incorporating 21.21-2); Humphreys v. Fort Worth Lloyds, 617
S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ). The court held in Humphreys
that:
The legislature did not intend 21.21-2 to and it does not foreclose a private cause of action
for the wrongful handling of an insurance claim by acts and practices which are declared,
in other statutes the legislature enacted at the same session, to be unfair or deceptive in
the business of insurance, and for which a private cause of action is sanctioned.
Id.
49. See Cantu v. Western Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., Ltd., 716 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(no private cause of action under article 21.21-2
of Insurance Code); Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (private cause of action not granted to individual under
Insurance Code for unfair claim practice); see also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon
1981)(provides investigation of unfair practices and remedy by State Board of Insurance
through issuance of cease and desist order).
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and fair dealing.5" Lower court opinions, therefore, have resulted in conflicting views as to whether a private cause of action existed for a first party
claim when the post-loss claim was mishandled. 51
In Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., the Texas Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether an insured can maintain a cause of
action for unfair claims settlement practices by an insurer under the DTPA
or Texas Insurance Code.5 3 The majority found that a cause of action for
"unfair claims settlement practices" could be found under section
17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA on any of the three alternative grounds.5 4 In

50. See Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).
A cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is stated when it is
alleged that there is no reasonable basis for denial of a claim or delay in payment or a
failure on the part of the insurer to determine whether there is any reasonable basis for the
denial or delay.
Id. Compare Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. 1988Xdecision reiterates duty of insurer to deal fairly and duty found to arise out of special trust relationship between insured and insurer) with Chitsey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641,
642 (Tex. 1987)(supreme court failed to recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing and
recovery limited to amount for breach of contract or tort). See generally G. KORNBLUM, M.
KAUFMAN & H. LEVINE, BAD FAITH PRACTICE GUIDE - TEXAS EDITION (1987)(covenant of
good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract, but when covenant breached, gives rise
not only to breach of contract action but also to tort liability).
51. Compare Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex Civ. App.Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(Texas Insurance Code does not confer private cause of action to individual injured by unfair claim settlement practice) and Russell v. Hartford Casualty
Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(private cause of
action not conferred to individuals for unfair claim settlement rather remedy is cease and
desist order) with Humphreys v. Fort Worth Lloyds, 617 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1981, no writ)(legislature did not intend to cut off private cause of action and did not
foreclose private cause of action for unfair or deceptive acts in insurance industry) and Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1979, no writ)(post-loss representation provided plaintiffs with cause of action). See also
Kreisler, A Survey of Insurance Litigation Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 18
TEX. TECH L. REV. 177. 208 (1977)(law seems unsettled in first-party claims and Texas
Supreme Court can settle).
52. 754 S.W.2d 129, 134-35 (Tex. 1988)(insured entitled to recover for failure by insured
to pay claim under DTPA).
53. Id. at 136. The court allowed the Vails a private cause of action based upon the
statutory allegations of the DTPA under section 17.50(a) and article 21.21 of the Insurance
Code. Id. Additionally, the claim of a breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair
dealing was also a basis for recovery. Id.
54. Id. at 136. The court stated that under section 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA, the plaintiffs' alternatives were:
I. Art. 21.21 § 16 of the Insurance Code, section 4(a) of Board Order 18663 and the
definition of unfair claims settlement practice in article 21.21-2 § 2(d) of the Insurance Code;
2. By incorporating art. 21.21 § 16 of Insurance Code, section 4(b) of Board Order
18663, and the determinations made by this court in Arnold and Aranda; and
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reaching this conclusion, the majority recognized that the DTPA and Insurance Code both grant relief for "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" and,
pursuant to the legislative mandate, both are to be construed liberally to
promote their remedial goals." The contention that the legislature had
"sealed off" any private cause of action for unfair claims settlement practices under article 21.21-2 was rejected by the majority.5 6 In addition, the
majority relied on Arnold " and Aranda " in determining that an insurer's
lack of good faith when processing a claim is a deceptive or unfair act or

3. By incorporating art. 21.21 § 16 of the Insurance Code and section 17.46 of the
DTPA.
Id. Under the first alternative, section 17.50(a)(4) incorporates the remedies provision of the
Insurance Code art. 21.21, section 16. Id. at 132. Recovery is permitted under section 16
when any person has been injured by another party engaging in:
1. any of the practices declared to be unfair or deceptive by Section 4 of article 21.21;
2. conduct defined in rules or regulations lawfully adopted by the Board under article
21.21 as unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
business of insurance; or
3. any practice defined by Section 17.46 of the Business & Commerce Code, as amended,
as an unlawful deceptive trade practice.
Id. at 132-133. The Vails' claim asserted Texas Farm's conduct was a violation of the second
and third types of conduct listed in section 16. Id. at 133. The second type of conduct required incorporation of the State Board of Insurance Order 18663, which is now 28 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 21.2 (Hart. Nov. 1, 1986). Id. Section 4(a) of this Board Order prohibits any
person from engaging in practices which are defined in the Insurance Code as being unfair or
deceptive. This section combined with the definition of unfair claims settlement found in art.
21.21.2 of the Insurance Code completes the first alternative. Id. The second alternative requires the incorporation of article 4(b) of Board Order 18663. Id. at 135. This section prohibits practices which are determined pursuant to law to be unfair or deceptive. Id. The previous
supreme court decisions in Aranda and Arnold provided determination that were pursuant to
law that an insurer who fails to process a claim in good faith is engaging in an unfair or
deceptive act. The final alternative is based upon the third type of conduct prohibited in article
21.21 section 16. Although section 17.46 of the DTPA enumerates specific conduct which is
false, misleading or a deceptive act, its list is not exclusive. This section encompasses any type
of activity that deceives the consumer. Any violation of section 17.46 of the DTPA is actionable under article 21.21, section 16 of the Insurance Code. Id.
55. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Tex. 1988)(legislature mandates DTPA and Insurance Code to be construed liberally to promote remedial
purpose).
56. See id. at 134-35 (article 21.21-2 does not provide private cause of action but definitions may be incorporated into the rules and regulations of the Insurance Board); TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981)(prohibits insurer from engaging in unfair settlement
practices). Section 2(d) of this article provides that "not attempting in good faith to effectuate
prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear" is one of the acts which constitutes an unfair claim settlement practice. Id.
57. See Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 135 (Arnold v. National County Mutual decision determined
insurer had duty to process insurance claim in good faith).
58. See id. (Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America held duty of good faith breached
when claim not promptly paid once liability established).
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practice.59 Based upon these decisions, an insurer's failure to process a
claim when liability is reasonably clear is a breach of the duty of good
faith. 6°
Dissenting, Justice Gonzalez stated that in order for the majority to find a
private cause of action, it had to resort to a "tortured reading of the DTPA
and Insurance Code.",6 1 Justice Gonzalez reasoned that, had the legislature
intended to create a private cause of action, it would have acknowledged this
intention in the act's legislative history and would have provided a specific
provision in the respective codes.62 The dissent further disagreed with the
court's failure to recognize the decision in Chitsey which held, in part, that a
"determination of law" which creates a cause of action under DTPA or Insurance Code must be determined by a state agency or possibly by legislative
authorization. 63 Because the Chitsey decision could not be distinguished,
Justice Gonzalez found that the Vails had no cause of action. 6
The Texas Supreme Court, in reaching its decision in Vail, did not read

59. See id The prior holdings in A randa and Arnold are determinations that lack of good
faith by an insurance company in the processing of a claim is an unfair act or practice. Id.
These holdings are determinations "pursuant to law" that an insurer who fails to process a
claim in good faith is engaging in deceptive or unfair practices. Id.; see also Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. 1988)(duty of good faith and fair dealing
arising under common law and applied to contracts equally applicable to insurance contracts);
Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987Xduty of good
faith and fair dealing breached when no reasonable basis for insurer to deny claim or delay
payment).
60. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 135 (Tex. 1988)(holdings in Aranda and Arnold established duty of good faith and duty breached by failing to pay
claim promptly).
61. Id. at 138 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (cause of action found only through tortured
reading of DTPA and Insurance Code).
62. Id. (legislature would have created private cause of action in specific section of DTPA
or Insurance Code).
63. See Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 138-39 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Justice Gonzalez found
several contradictions. Id. The insurance company's refusal to pay the claim must be shown
to be a frequent occurrence to indicate that it is a general business practice before a claim
would have been allowed in Chitsey. Prohibited conduct is to be determined by law before a
cause of action can be established. A jury determination that the conduct is prohibited is not a
valid determination of law. The determination must be made by a state agency or even reserved solely for the legislature. The majority in Vail now had the power previously reserved
for that state agency or legislature. Id. at 139; see also Chitsey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738
S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. 1987)(rejected recovery under article 21.21 since actions not committed
with "frequency"). Court determined findings of conduct must be frequent to be recoverable.
Id. The duty of good faith and fair dealing are not recognized. Id. at 643-44. The court did,
however, allow recovery under breach of contract or tort. Id. at 644.
64. See Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 139 (Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting). No cause of action was stated
by Vail under sections 17.50(a)(4) and 16(a) of the Insurance Code. Id. at 139. In addition, to
establish an unfair claim settlement practice, 21.21-2, frequency must be proven to elevate the
claim to an unfair settlement practice. Id. at 138-39.
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the provisions of the DTPA and the Insurance Code in a "tortured manner"
as the dissent claimed, but rather in the manner intended by the legislature-to provide consumers an adequate remedy. 65 The goal of the DTPA
is to provide adequate remedies to an aggrieved consumer and, therefore, a
broad interpretation of the act is allowed by the courts to provide consumers
this remedy and deter the continuance of deceptive practices. 66 This remedy
has now been extended to first-party claims against insurance companies
where previously only an administrative remedy had been allowed. 6 7 The
dissent erroneously claimed the majority had not only misread the DTPA
but also contradicted a recent supreme court decision.68 Careful review,

65. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon 1987)(section provides for
DTPA to be liberally construed to protect consumers by providing adequate and economical
remedies). Purpose of DTPA's treble damage provision is to encourage individuals to bring
suit which will reduce the need for public enforcement. See Pennington v. Singleton, 606
S.W.2d 682, 690 (Tex. 1980). The legislature also recognized that consumers were faced with
high costs in order to litigate, these costs being time and money. Id. The extra damage recovery was therefore provided to give incentive to consumers to pursue their claims. Id.; see also
Woo v. Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978,
writ ref'd n.re.)(DTPA resulted from inadequate common law remedies and DTPA's remedies are in addition to any other remedies available under law); Hill, Introduction to Consumer
Law Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609, 614 (1977)(obvious answer to problem of high litigation cost was to provide treble damages which would encourage private redress of grievances).
66. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 670-71 (Tex. 1977)(legislative intent of
DTPA to encourage consumers to seek compensation and deter unscrupulous sellers from
employing deceptive practices); McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, no writ)(DTPA to provide effective relief for consumers who otherwise
would not sue except for prospect of treble damages and further legislative intent to encourage
redress by consumers and deter unscrupulous practices); see also Hill, Introduction to Consumer Law Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609, 614 (1977)(consumers encouraged to litigate
grievances through DTPA's lightening of burden of proof and recovery of multiple damages
plus court costs and attorney's fees).
67. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex.
1988)(supreme court granted cause of action under DTPA for unfair claims settlement practices resulting from mishandling post-loss claim). But see Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin,
574 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(private cause of action not granted to individual harmed by unfair settlement practice). The legislature's remedy
for an individual injured by unfair claim settlement is art. 21.21-2. Id. If the State Board of
Insurance determines such a violation occurred it has the power to stop the practice through
issuance of cease and desist orders. Id. See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 56 (Supp. 1988)(private cause of action may be maintained under DTPA and Insurance Code for any conduct prohibited by Insurance Code, by
rules or regulations, or by law as unfair or deceptive).
68. See Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 138 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (claimed majority opinion contradicted Chitsey since Chitsey required prohibited conduct be determined by legislative authority and majority was now usurping that authority). But see Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 135
(majority did not rely on jury finding, as disapproved in Chitsey, but rather relied on two
previous supreme court decisions).
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however, shows that the previous decision is distinguishable.69 Had the
Texas Supreme Court not provided a private remedy in this case, the administrative remedy of article 21.21-2 would not have offered an enhanced supervision of the insurance industry, but instead undercut the DTPA's intent
to encourage private redress.70 This redress, while serving as a deterrent, is
not unlimited and therefore protects the insurance industry from unfounded
claims.7 1
By promoting the Texas legislature's intent, the Texas Supreme Court is
in accord with numerous decisions providing for a broad interpretation of
the DTPA to provide relief for injured consumers.7 2 A broad interpretation
of the DTPA is necessary due to human ingenuity in creating loopholes in
the DTPA's provisions and allowing the same deceptive acts and practices to
continue without consequence. 73 These loopholes prompted the legislature

69. Compare Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 130-31 (Vail's purchased insurance, filed claim and denied recovery for no valid reason) with Chitsey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641,
642 (Chitsey misrepresented information to insurer and was offered settlement which he

refused).
70. Compare TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon Supp. 1988)(purpose to regulate

insurance industry by defining and prohibiting unfair trade practices) with TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 198 l)(further defines acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive
acts). See also Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act, ch. 319, § 1, 735 Tex. Gen. Laws 1973.
(legislature amended chapter 21 of insurance code to include this act). The provisions of art.
21.21-2 are not to reduce or eliminate the other available remedies to the Insurance Board and
are to be cumulative to the existing law. Id. at 739; 19 J.APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 10557, 635-636 (rev. ed. 1982)(clearly erroneous not to give
private individual cause of action even though insurance commissioner had power to enjoin
unfair acts or practices); see also Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 690 (Tex.
1980)(purpose of DTPA to encourage litigation and deter violations thereof).
71. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988)(groundless action
brought in bad faith or to harass results in plaintiff paying costs).
72. See, e.g., Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 686 (legislature created private action to provide
consumers with incentive and method to discourage deceptive trade practices). In addition, a
broad interpretation of section 17.46 is warranted because of human ingenuity to continue in
such deceptive acts and practices without violating the DTPA. See id. at 688. The legislature's express purpose for the DTPA was to protect consumers and therefore would not allow
it to be circumvented by those who devised new loopholes. Id.; Dairyland County Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no
writ)(purpose of DTPA to protect consumer and provide efficient and economical procedures
to secure this protection); Woo v. Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(DTPA's intent is for injured plaintiff to recover
greatest amount of damages-this serves dual purpose of Act which is to encourage consumers
to litigate grievances and deter unlawful conduct); McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395,
396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ)(legislative intent to encourage remedies by consumers deterring unscrupulous sellers through treble damage awards).
73. See Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 688 (because of human inventiveness in engaging in
misleading or deceptive conduct, broad interpretation of DTPA is warranted and caused legislature to initially provide consumers with action under "catch-all" provisions of § 17.46); see
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to structure the DTPA's provisions loosely to encompass more areas and to
allow some provisions to overlap thereby preventing circumvention of the
express purpose of the DTPA.7 4 The Vails themselves needed the protection
of the DTPA since the insurance company wrongfully denied their claim on
a pretense of arson when in fact the Vails were only trying to collect what
was rightfully theirs. 75 Therefore, because this intent to protect the consumer and encourage litigation is well-founded, 76 a "tortured reading"
would have resulted if the Texas Supreme Court had not allowed the Vails a
private cause of action when Texas Farm engaged in its deceptive acts and
practices.
The Texas Supreme Court, in allowing a first party claim against an insurance company, is finally granting relief which had previously been available
to most other insured individuals but not to first party claimants.7 s Causes
of actions are available to persons when false representations are made to
them regarding their insurance coverage 79 and are also available to persons
also D.

BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LrrIGATION ix (2d ed.
1983)(DTPA amended in each legislative session since 1973 indicating need for legislature to
close various loopholes).
74. See Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 688 (overlapping of DTPA's provisions may occur as
result of broad interpretation given to violations resulting under section 17.46).
75. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. 1988)(Texas
Farm refused to settle claim after their liability reasonably clear).
76. See, e.g., Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1979, no writ)(purpose of DTPA to protect consumers by
providing efficient and economical ways to consumer to litigate claims for unfair, misleading,
or deceptive acts or practices); Woo, 565 S.W.2d at 298 (dual purpose of DTPA to encourage
litigation which will in turn deter unfair and deceptive conduct); McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550
S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ)(legislative intent to encourage consumers to bring suit thereby deterring unscrupulous sellers from persisting in deceptive or
unfair conduct).
77. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1977)(court should look diligently
for legislative intent). A court must keep in mind at all times when interpreting law, the
legislative intent-what the old law was, what the evil to be prevented is, and what remedy is
to be provided; and must construe the act accordingly rather than construe the statute by the
literal meaning of the words used. Id. at 665; see also City of Mason v. West Texas Util. Co.,
150 Tex. 18, 26, 237 S.W.2d 273, 278 (1951)(aim and purpose of court's interpretation of law is
to ascertain and enforce legislative intent, not to defeat, thwart, or nullify purpose).
78. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 891-92 (Tex. 1985)(employee for whom
insurance purchased allowed recovery); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 603 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(insured allowed recovery for mishandling of third party
claim); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186, 191 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ)(cause of action granted to insured when policy coverage
misrepresented).
79. See Dairyland County, 578 S.W.2d at 188 (recovery allowed where Plaintiff told car
insurance would be renewed when in fact, insurance company let policy expire); see also Aetna
Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Marshall, 724 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. 1987). Marshall arose under a
worker's compensation claim where the insurance company misrepresented the coverage and

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol20/iss3/9

18

Christmas: Private Cause of Action for Unfair Insurance Claim Settlement Pra

1989]

CASENOTE

whose third party claims are improperly handled." Using these decisions as
a foundation, the court merely follows precedent by granting persons whose
first-party claims are denied a more powerful judicial remedy." The only
remedy previously provided under the Insurance Code was a cease and desist order when the insurance company's conduct was found to be "fre-

quent." 2 Recognizing the unequal bargaining power between the insurer
and insured, 3 the court granted the consumer, who pays premiums to re-

medical benefits to be received. Id. The Texas Supreme Court found that misrepresentations
of this type were just the sort of conduct which give rise to actions under the provisions of the
DTPA and Insurance Code. Id. at 772; Kennedy, 689 S.W.2d at 891-92 (DTPA expanded to
provide coverage to employee for whom coverage had been purchased by employer); McCrann
v. Klaneckey, 667 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ)(plaintiffs
wanted to purchase insurance and although never received actual coverage, were allowed recovery for misrepresentation even though never actually acquired good or service).
80. See, e.g.. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, opinion approved)(landmark case which allowed third-party claim
liability); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 605-06 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)(allowed third-party liability); see also Kreisler, A Survey of Insurance Litigation
Under the Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesAct, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 177, 195 (1987). The
importance of the Kelly decision is that it does away with the insurance industry's misconception that post-loss misconduct is not actionable under the DTPA section 17.50 and the Insurance Code through art. 21.21. Id. at 195. The Kelly decision also allowed treble damages for a
decision arising under a Stowers cause of action. Id.
81. See, e.g., Allstate Ins, Co., 680 S.W.2d at 605-06 (third-party liability settled which
allows cause of action for post-loss claims mishandling); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co., 578
S.W.2d at 188 (cause of action found when misrepresentation made as to insurance coverage);
see also Kreisler, A Survey of InsuranceLitigation Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, TEX. TECH L. REV. 177, 209-10 (1977)(number of cases have found post-loss conduct
actionable under DTPA for ample authority for consumer to have first-party action).
82. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981). Section (2) of this article lists
the prohibited practices which are considered unfair claim settlement practices. See id. In
addition, these acts must be committed with "frequency" to be an unfair claim practice. Id.
The term "frequency" is left undefined. Id. Section 6(a) provides the penalties which are
assessed for violations of this article. See id. It provides that upon the State Board of Insurance's finding that a violation of this act has occurred, it shall issue a cease and desist order to
the insurance company directing it to halt the unlawful practices. Id.; see also Vail v. Texas
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 138 (Tex. 1988)(Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Justice Gonzalez first claims that the majority is making a false interpretation of article 21.21-2 by
not requiring "frequency" to be a requisite element of the acts defined in this section. Id. at
138. Later, he claims that "frequency" may not be a necessary element of the actual act but is
only a requirement to graduate the act to an unfair claim settlement practice. Id. at 138-39. It
would appear that the dissent is agreeing with the majority interpretation that 21.21-2 can be
used only for definitional purposes. See id.
83. See Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex.
1987)(duty of good faith and fair dealing applies to insurers). The Arnold decision recognized
that there is a special relationship which is a product of the unequal bargaining power of the
parties in the insurance context. Id. Because of this unequal nature, insurance companies
could take advantage of a claimant's misfortune and arbitrarily deny or delay payment of a
claim since the only penalty they would incur would be interest on the amount owed. Since
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ceive the coverage, some leverage to recover a valid claim.8 4
The dissent would not have allowed the individual to recover in this case,
claiming the majority had misread the DTPA and Insurance Code 5 and
also ignored a recent Texas Supreme Court decision in Chirsey. 6 The dissent's use of Chitsey can be distinguished upon two bases: 1) through an
examination of the facts, 7 and 2) the provisions of DTPA and Insurance
Code used in each case.8" First, the plaintiff in Chitsey differs from the Vails
in that Chitsey made some misrepresentations to the insurance company
concerning the property.8 9 In addition, the insurance company offered a settlement to Chitsey which the insured refused before filing suit. 9° In contrast,

the company has exclusive control over how the claims are evaluated, processed, and denied,
the Arnold court implied a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court held that a cause of
action existed under good faith and fair dealing when there was no reasonable basis for denying or delaying the payment of the claim. Id.; see also Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748
S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. 1988)(decision relied upon language of Arnold and recognized special
relationship arising under insurance contracts and inequality of bargaining power).
84. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex. 1988)(incongruous to deny protection to individual who pays premiums from recovery where claim
wrongfully denied). Premium paying individual entitled to DTPA's protection because barring this cause of action would contradict the remedial purpose of both DTPA and Insurance
Code. Id.; see also Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 168 (exemplary damages as well as damages for
mental anguish allowed for breach of good faith and fair dealing); Woo v. Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(injured
plaintiff is to recover greatest amount of damages in order to deter unfair conduct).
85. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 138 (Tex. 1988)(Gonzalez, J., dissenting)(majority resorted to reading DTPA and Insurance Code in tortured manner because nothing in legislative history suggests what majority allowed in decision).
86. 738 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. 1987)(rejected cause of action under article 21.21 of Insurance Code and did not recognize good faith and fair dealing). The jury in this decision first
determined that the insurance company had committed an unfair act. Id. The supreme court,
however, rejected the argument that the jury determination was a determination by law which
created the cause of action under article 21.21. It also rejected the claim that language of
Board Order 41060 provided a cause of action because Chitsey failed to prove that the act or
practice was committed frequently so to establish a business practice. Id. Lastly, the supreme
court disregarded the jury's finding that the insurance company had violated its duty of good
faith and fair dealing as established in Arnold by allowing recovery under either a breach of
contract or tort theory. Id. at 644.
87. Compare Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 130-31 (Tex.
1988)(Vails' claim denied for no valid reason) with Chitsey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738
S.W.2d 641, 641-42 (Tex. 1987)(insured refused insurers settlement offer and filed suit).
88. Compare Vail. 754 S.W.2d at 133-34 (one basis of recovery used section 16 of art.
21.21 of Insurance Code by incorporating Board Order 41454 which requires proof of more
than one act) with Chitsey, 738 S.W.2d at 643 (based recovery on use of Board Order 41454
which requires proof of more than one act).
89. See Chitsey, 738 S.W.2d at 642 (jury found plaintiff made misrepresentations concerning his plans to insurance company regarding property).
90. See id. (insurance company sent adjuster and homebuilder who valued claim at less
than full policy amount).
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the plaintiffs in Vail did not make any misrepresentation to Texas Farm and
were never offered a settlement at any time. 9 ' Secondly, Vail and Chitsey
differ in the provisions on which each respective plaintiff relied in asserting a
cause of action under the DTPA and Insurance Code.92 The plaintiff argued
in Chitsey that article 21.21, section 16(a) of the Insurance Code was violated by conduct which the Insurance Board had declared to be an unfair or
deceptive act or practice.9 3 The plaintiff in Chitsey further relied on a board
order9 4 which prohibited any practice "determined by law" to be an unfair
or deceptive act or practice.9" The court held that a jury determination was
not a determination of law, and instead required a finding by a state agency
or possibly even a legislative determination to create a cause of action.96 Not
only was the jury determination not sufficient to create the cause of action,
but Chitsey also relied on an additional Board Order requiring the insurer to
have frequently acted deceptively. 97 In contrast, the Vail cause of action did

91. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. 1988)(home
burned during term of policy and was total loss, allegation of arson had no validity). Insurance company first would not pay the claim arguing that they had not received an adequate
contents list and later changed basis of denial to an unfounded arson claim. Id.
92. Compare Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 132-33 (one basis of recovery focused on using section
16 of article 21.21 of Insurance Code by incorporating Board Order 18663) with Chitsey v.
National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. 1987)(basis of recovery also used section
16 of article 21.21 but relied on Board Order 41454).
93. See Chitsey, 738 S.W.2d at 642-43 (although not listed in section 17.46 as unlawful
trade practice or contained in "laundry list" of section 17.46, Chitsey claimed insurer's failure
to use due diligence in determining his loss was practice declared by Board of Insurance as
unfair method of competition or deceptive or unfair practice).
94. See Chitsey, 738 S.W.2d at 643. The plaintiff argued that the insurance company's
failure to use diligence in determining his loss was a violation of the Insurance Code, State
Board of Insurance Code Order 41060. Id. Part (b) of the Order states that no person shall
engage in conduct which is determined "pursuant to law" to be an unfair or deceptive practice
in the Insurance industry. Id.
95. See Chitsey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. 1987)(court holding correct role for jury is to determine facts, not matters of law, and decisions as to determinations of law should be made by state agency or legislature).
96. See Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 133 (Board Order 18663, section 4 permits cause of action
when practice complained of defined by Insurance Code or other rules or regulations or determined by law to be unfair practice). In article 21.21-2 specific acts are defined which are unfair
claim settlement practices. Id. at 134. These definitions when incorporated with Board Order
18663 provide a cause of action since the definition is being employed, not the sanctions of
21.21-2. Id. Alternatively, a cause of action may be found under this order if the act has been
determined pursuant to law to be an unfair claims settlement. Id. at 133. While recognizing
that a jury determination does not qualify as a determination of law, the majority in Vail relied
on two prior decisions as determinations pursuant to law. Id. at 135; see also TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 21.21-2, § 2(d) (Vernon 198 1)(section defines unfair practice as claimed in this cause
of action).
97. See Chitsey, 738 S.W.2d at 643 (incorporates Board Order 41454 through language of
Board Order 41060). Under Board Order 51565, however, the unfair claim practice had to be
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not require a determination of law, but rather was based on specific language
contained in a statute as an unfair claim settlement practice.9" The Texas
Supreme Court granted a cause of action based upon established law99 and
did not rely upon the jury to make a determination of law as was the case in
Chitsey.1 " Therefore, taking into consideration the differences discussed,
the decision in Chitsey is not contradicted by the Vail decision, as Justice
Gonzalez claims, but rather is distinguishable." 0 '
In Vail, the Texas Supreme Court furthered the remedial goals of the legislature by providing remedies for a first-party claim under the DTPA and
Insurance Code. t°2 Adhering to this remedial goal, article 21.21 of the Insurance Code begins with the stated purpose to regulate the trade practices
within the insurance industry while providing a private cause of action to
individuals harmed by deceptive acts or practices.' 0 3 Further, article 21.212 enhances article 21.21 because it provides for continued monitoring of the
insurance company who has had frequent claims filed against it." 4 Had the

committed with frequency which would establish this as a general business practice of the
insurance company. Id. Because Chitsey was unable or failed to prove this frequency requirement, the court denied recovery. Id.
98. See Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 135 (Board Order relied upon in this decision granted cause
of action for practices which have already been determined pursuant to law to be unfair practices and courts, who readily decide matters of law, can thus make determination whether act
in question was unfair or deceptive).
99. Id. (decisions in Arnold and Aranda determine conduct considered unfair or deceptive
and are determinations of law).
100. See Chitsey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. 1987)jury found
insurance company failed to use due diligence in determining amount of loss but determination
cannot be substituted for declaration of what constitutes prohibited conduct).
101. Compare Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 131-32 (Tex.
1988)(claim denied for no apparent reason, never offered settlement by insurance company,
and cause of action based on specific provisions of DTPA and Insurance Code) with Chitsey v.
National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641, 642-43 (Tex. 1987)(plaintiff also found to have
made misrepresentation, was offered settlement, and based cause of action on unwritten provision of Insurance Code requiring determination of law and on provision requiring frequency).
102. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Tex. 1977)(DTPA enacted to provide
consumers methods and incentives to deter deceptive trade practices); see also Melody Homes
Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. 1987). The court recognized the shift from
economy dealing primarily in goods to one now more service oriented. Id. Public policy mandated a change to protect consumers so the court and the legislature interpreted the theory of
implied warranty to be applied to products, goods, and new houses. The court recognized in
Melody Lhat it can best serve the law when it can disregard an old rule and replace it with one
society needs. Id. at 354.
103. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon Supp. 1988). The Act's purpose is to
regulate practices of the insurance companies. Id. This purpose is to be fulfilled by defining or
providing the method by which unfair or deceptive acts can be determined. This article is also
intended by the legislature to be liberally construed. Id.
104. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981)(if insurance company out of

line, State Board of Insurance can require it to file period reports, can hire investigators to
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legislature not intended to protect the individual and intended only for actions to be filed by the State Board of Insurance, it certainly could have
expressed such intent by language in the statute that would clearly indicate a
bar to private causes of action.'0 5
Finally, by encouraging consumers to litigate, the legislature will actually
decrease the number of suits brought by encouraging settlement through the
threat of treble damages." The threat of treble damages, however, is not
without limits.'0 7 The legislature recognized the potential abuse which
could be made of this section and inserted appropriate safeguards to protect
the insurance companies.'0" Therefore, both the consumer and insuror are
protected by providing relief to injured plaintiffs and limiting this to claims
of consumers actually harmed. 1"9
In Vail, the court has settled the question of whether an individual has a

enforce, can hold hearings to review allegations, and can issue cease and desist orders ordering
unlawful practice to stop); see also Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129,
134-35 (Tex. 1988)(21.21-2 requires frequency of acts before allowing Insurance Board to impose sanction).
105. See Mobile County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewell, 555 S.W.2d 903, 909-10 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). At one time article 21.21, section 16 of the Insurance
Code was not applicable to county mutual insurance companies. Id. at 909. The legislature
expressed clear intent by reenacting the exemption so to prevent county mutual insurance
companies from being subjected to the DTPA. Id. at 910. In 1981, this exemption was withdrawn by the legislature. See D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER
LITIGATION 175 (2d ed. 1983).

106. See also Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 690 (Tex. 1980)(purpose of treble
damages provision in DTPA is to encourage private litigation and deter violations of the
DTPA).
107. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988Xif action brought

to harass or is groundless and brought in bad faith, defendant awarded attorney's fees and
court costs). TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 1987)(identical provision as
in insurance code providing defendant recovery of attorney's fees and court costs for actions in
bad faith, harassment or groundless); see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.505(d) (Vernon
1987)(if offer of settlement rejected by consumer and damages found by court substantially
same consumer may not recover more than offer or court's award, whichever less).
108. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(c)(Vernon Supp. 1988)(defendant

prevails if action groundless, in bad faith or for harassment); see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 1987)(identical provision as in insurance code providing defendant
recovery of attorney's fees and court costs for actions in bad faith, harassment or groundless);
Pope v. Darcy, 667 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(case need not be prosecuted to conclusion before attorney's fees awarded for suit
brought under DTPA in bad faith). The court in Pope further explained that it was not error
for the trial court to decide the suit was groundless. See id. at 274. In an action brought under
section 17.50(c) of the DTPA, the jury decides the issues of harassment and bad faith, while
the judge determines if the suit is groundless. Id. See generally, Leikam & Corbin, Woods v.
Littleton: Consumerism Comes ofAge, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 477, 490 (1977)(groundless finding must
be by court but not affirmative defense that has to be plead and proved).
109. Id.
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private cause of action in a first-party claim. The individual who pays premiums in order to obtain and retain coverage now has a remedy against the
insurance company that wrongfully denies claims, beyond suing for the premium plus interest and attorney's fees, or to seek a cease and desist order
issued by the State Board of Insurance if their conduct is proven as "frequent." The insurance company and the insured are not on equal bargaining
terms because the insured has very few options as to the contents of a standard form insurance policy. Since the DTPA's purpose is to protect the
consumer and deter deceptive or unfair acts and practices, a private cause of
action given to a first-party claimant, with the prospect of treble damages,
will enhance the DTPA's deterrence objective. Faced with this possibility,
more insurance companies might be willing to settle before trial, thus eliminating the flood of litigation which some might see as resulting from this
decision.
Gloria F Christmas
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